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The importance of transitional justice became increasingly apparentthroughout the 1990s, when the democratic transitions of countriesSamuel Huntington designated as belonging to the “third wave”
entered their final phase. (1) In 2004, attesting to its importance, the UN
defined transitional justice as “the full range of processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-
scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve
reconciliation.” (2) Whilst enumerating the different aspects covered by this
type of public action, that is to say the mechanisms that enable light to be
shed on past events, victims to be compensated, legal proceedings to be
brought, and the introduction of institutional reforms accompanied by
lustration laws to the detriment of the criminals, the UN Report also
emphasises that they must be seen as a coherent whole. Indeed, the
measures are interactive, and it is only by considering transitional justice
from a holistic perspective that they can be fully effective. If, for example,
the awarding of material reparation is not accompanied by an effort to
expose the truth concerning human rights violations in the pre-democratic
period that led to the condemnation of the authors of these acts, it is highly
probable that the victims will perceive compensation as a second-best
measure incapable of obtaining true justice for them. (3) Two forms of
recognition are required, since it is a question of returning to both the
actions of the authoritarian regime and the unique experience of each of
the victims. 
Taiwan, a democracy that is both recent and stable, has experienced two
movements for the rehabilitation of victims of the Nationalist dictatorship.
The first demanded that the state shed light on the massacres committed
by the Nationalist army in March and April 1947, commonly known as the
“28 February Incident” or the “228 Incident” (Ererba shijian) (4) and that it
assume its responsibilities by attempting to make reparation for the wrongs
committed. The second was in relation to the abuses committed by the
police of the Nationalist regime during the authoritarian period, an
experience known as the White Terror (baise kongbu). (5)
The White Terror began in 1948 with the adoption of the Temporary
Provisions during the period of mobilisation for the suppression of the
rebellion (dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi tiaokuan), reinforced the following
year by the Provisions for the suppression of the rebellion (chengzhi panluan
tiaoli) and martial law (jieyan fa), both implemented in 1949. In 1950, the
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4. After regaining control of Taiwan in 1945, the Nationalist government rapidly alienated the local
population by excluding it from managing political affairs, by its corruption, by adopting a preda-
tory attitude to economic affairs, and by various discriminatory measures, all on the pretext of
the excessive “Japanisation” of the islanders. Against this problematic background, the beating up
of a female contraband cigarette vendor by the police on the evening of 27 February 1947 de-
generated the following day into anti-government riots in Taipei that rapidly spread to the whole
island. Ad-hoc committees were created to negotiate with the authorities, made up mostly of
members of the local elite. Whilst holding discussions with these assemblies, Governor Chen Yi
requested reinforcements from Nanjing, which arrived in early March. From that moment on and
for a little over a month, these troops gave themselves over to violent acts that resulted in be-
tween 18,000 and 28,000 deaths, including most of the Taiwanese elite. Source: Chen Kuan-cheng,
“[Ererba shijian] siwang renshu de renkouxue tuiji” (Demographic estimate of the number of
deaths in the 228 Incident), in Xingzhengyuan yanjiu [Ererba shijian] xiaozu, Ererba shijian yanjiu
baogao (Study Report on the 228 Incident), Taipei, Executive Yuan 1992, fifth appendix. After 1947,
the 228 Incident soon became a taboo subject, briefly mentioned seven times in the Island press
from 1947 to 1987.  Source: Chen Tsui-lien, “Lishi zhengyi de kunjing: zuqun yiti yu Ererba lunshu”
(The impasse of historic justice: The ethnic question and statements on the 228 Incident), Guoshi
guan xueshu jikan (Academia Historica Academic Journal), No. 16, 2008, p. 192.
5. Although it would be a mistake to try to estimate the number of victims of the White Terror
solely from requests for compensation, the number that emerges – between 22,000 and 40,000
individuals – matches that found in the archives, open since 2000. However, although at an ad-
vanced stage, the archive collection nonetheless remains incomplete. By way of example, in March
2016, a collector declared that he possessed more than 1,000 documents relating to the White
Terror. The conditions of access to the existing documentation are another fiercely debated issue.
Source: Jason Pan, “Collector has over 1,000 White Terror Documents,” Taipei Times, 9 March 2016,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/03/09/2003641139 (accessed on 9
March 2016). Moreover, the great majority of the victims of the White Terror were imprisoned,
since 10.15 % of the compensation cases concern people condemned to death, then executed.
Ni Tzu-hsiu (ed.), Buchang jinjinhui shiwu zhounian chengguo jinian zhuanji: 1998-2014 (Report
Commemorating the Compensation Foundation’s 15 Years of Results), Taipei, Caituan faren jieyan
shiqi budang ji feidie shenpan anjian buchang jijinhui, 2014, p. 37.
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Transitional Justice and Collective
Memory in Taiwan
How Taiwanese Society is Coming to Terms with Its Authoritarian Past
VLADIMIR  STOLOJAN
ABSTRACT: Recognition of persecution during an authoritarian era is an issue that has arisen in every society that has undergone a successful
democratic transition in the second half of the twentieth century. The manner in which each country has dealt with the question in many ways
reflects the circumstances of its democratisation, and its past. In Taiwan, the development of transitional justice has mainly focused on the re-
cognition of the victims of two distinct historic experiences. This article aims to analyse the dynamic that has led to the recognition of the vic-
tims of the party-state that governed Taiwan from 1945 to 1992.
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Provisions for the control of spies during the period of provisional
mobilisation (kanluan shiqi jiansu feidie tiaoli) completed the existing
punitive arsenal. These laws formed the backbone of a security system that
authorised the arrest and trial by a military court of civilians under various
pretexts, which in practice meant arbitrarily. Martial law was lifted in 1987,
and the two other decrees in 1991. The reform in the same year of Article
100 (abolished in 1992) of the Penal Code, employed to legitimise the arrest
of persons promoting the independence of Taiwan, marked the end of the
White Terror. 
Even though we are dealing with different historic experiences, the two
dynamics are linked, since the adoption of a legal framework designed to
obtain justice for the victims of the White Terror used the measures decided
in favour of the victims of the 228 Incident as a model. Indeed, beginning
in February 1987, a few months before the lifting of martial law, the
movement for the rehabilitation of the 1947 victims emerged at the same
time as the early stages of the democratisation of Taiwan. The symbolic
force that was very rapidly invested in this memory in Taiwan elicited a swift
response from the Government. As we shall see, this precocity can be
explained by the central position occupied by the 228 Incident in Taiwanese
nationalism. However, the differences amongst the former political prisoners
then hindered the homogenisation of memories, a dynamic inherent in the
emergence of a collective memory as envisaged by Maurice Halbwachs.
Since they were not speaking with one voice, they were not able to assert
their rights. It was not until the state had created a precedent in recognising
the victims of 1947 that the rehabilitation of victims of the White Terror
could really begin. 
To this day, the compensation laws concerning victims of the authoritarian
era adopted in 1995 and 1998 form an essential part of Taiwanese
transitional justice. In March 2016, the elected members of the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) presented a draft Act completing the existing
framework. The fact that this motion was presented just three months after
the historic victories of the DPP and its allies in the presidential and
legislative elections of January 2016, shows that transitional justice remains
a topical issue in Taiwan, as does its importance as a subject of political
debate.
The aim of this article is to analyse the social conditions from which the
personal accounts of the 228 Incident and the White Terror emerged. Given
that local players seeking recognition for the experiences of the victims
formulated their demands by mobilising categories of action related to
transitional justice, it cannot be dissociated from the issues surrounding
social memory relating to the authoritarian period, since it is, in a sense,
the normative framework through which the “social memory currents” (6)
reflecting the experiences of the victims of the nationalist regime were
constituted. 
I will study here the way in which these currents were constituted rather
than their content, using academic research and the minutes obtained in
the course of a survey on current representations of the former
authoritarian nationalist regime carried out in Taiwan between 2012 and
2014.
The 228 model and its limits
Few subjects have been as frequently debated in Taiwan as the 228
Incident. Serving as the framework of numerous Taiwanese literary works, (7)
the 1947 tragedy has also been the subject of many films (8) and the
background to songs by politically committed rock groups. (9) Invisible during
the authoritarian period, the 228 Incident has since acquired the weight of
memory and therefore carries an emotional charge stronger than any other.
The 228 Incident was very quickly interpreted as being the founding event
of the Taiwanese independence movement, since it was after the massacres
that leading figures who were not on the island at the time founded the
first independence group, a year after the events. Up until democratisation,
the memory of the massacres subsisted in existing pro-independence
associations in Japan, then in the United States and Canada. It was not until
the movement had a solid foundation in Taiwan itself that the movement
for the rehabilitation of the 1947 victims got under way. Although they
were very different historic experiences, the measures adopted to obtain
justice for the victims of 1947 were then adapted to those of the White
Terror, so that it seems no exaggeration to refer to a “228 Model” for
Taiwanese transitional justice as a whole. 
The rehabilitation movement for victims of 228
The memory of the 228 Incident already occupied a central place in circles
that opposed the Kuomintang (KMT), since it was already understood as
the founding event of the Taiwanese independence movement. For example,
the first independence organisation, the Formosan League for Re-
emancipation (Taiwan zai jiefang lianmeng), was inaugurated on 28
February 1948, that is to say, a year after the events. Indeed, independence
activists have always, in the various countries in which the movement
developed, commemorated the 228 Incident, interpreted as the massacre
of Taiwanese people by the troops of a foreign, Chinese-origin regime.
Transmitted before 1987 mainly through pro-independence associations
set up outside Taiwan, the memory of 1947, even today, still plays the role
of “founding trauma” (10) in Taiwanese nationalism, since the massacres are
considered to have demonstrated the ethnic “otherness” that separates
Chinese and Taiwanese whilst at the same time attesting to the necessity
of putting an end to the domination of the island by the Republic of China. 
Already close to the democratic opposition before leaving Taiwan to
pursue his studies, it was in Japan that Chen Yong-hsing first gained access
to written first-hand accounts of the 1947 massacres before going to the
United States and meeting Chen Fan-ming, a pro-independence activist in
exile. Upon his return to the island in 1986, Chen Yong-hsing was appointed
head of the Taiwanese Association for Human Rights. At the end of the year,
together with several opposition intellectuals, the Association organised a
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6. For a detailed definition of this idea, see: Gérard Namer, Halbwachs et la mémoire sociale (Halb-
wachs and social memory), Paris, L’Harmattan, 2000, pp. 118-123.
7. Amongst the first works on the subject: Lin Shuang-pu, Ererba xiaoshuo xuan (Collection of Short
Stories on 228), Taipei, Ziliwanbao, 1989; and Lan Po-chou, Chenshi, liuwang, Ererba (Drowned,
Exiled, 228), Taipei, Shibao wenhua, 1991.
8. Hou Hsiao-hsien, Beiqing chengshi (City of Sadness), 1989; Lin Cheng-shen, Tianma chafang
(March of Happiness), 1999. The two films are amongst the two best-known films set against the
background of the 228 Incident. 
9. Mushen Wudedian (Defenders of Butik Palace), 2013, by the heavy metal group Chthonic, whose
singer is now a member of the Legislative Yuan, also comes to mind.
10. Here I am taking up the now well-accepted observation made by Ernest Renan in Qu’est ce qu’une
Nation (What Is a Nation?), where he remarks that “common suffering unites more than joy. In
fact, national memories and periods of mourning are worth more than triumphs since they impose
duties and require a common effort. A nation is therefore a great solidarity, built up from the feel-
ing of sacrifices made and those one is prepared to make in the future.” For the independence
movement, the 228 Incident represents the pinnacle of “common suffering,” its memory demand-
ing opposition to all forms of Chinese nationalism and the promotion of a different, Taiwan-cen-
tred nationalism. The text of Ernest Renan’s conference lecture is available online at
http://www.bmlisieux.com/archives/nation04.htm.
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conference dedicated to the events of February-March 1947, the first to be
held on the subject in Taiwan. It was, however, not the first time that the
subject had been tackled in public, since in 1985 Chiang Peng, an
independent member, called on the government during a session of the
Legislative Yuan, asking it to shed light on the murders of several opponents
in the early 1980s and on the events of 1947. In his speech, Chiang Peng
also requested that 28 February become a day of commemoration in
honour of the victims. (11) Although it had no direct link with the memory
of the 1947 massacres, the absence of a reaction from the police
department after the creation of the DPP in 1986 shows that the regime
accepted the opposition’s hitherto severely repressed position. This new
political openness, not seen since 1949, when Chen Yong-hsing, Cheng Nan-
jung (whose magazine Ziyou shidai was the main channel of
communication in the early days of the movement), and Lee Sheng-hsiung
established the Foundation to Make 28 February a Day of Peace (Ererba
heping jinian ri cujinhui), created a new window of opportunity. In 1987,
thanks to existing pro-independence networks, the Foundation organised
demonstrations in both north and south Taiwan that attracted the
participation of 30 or so groups close to the opposition (such as chapters
of the Presbyterian Church, the various sections of the DPP, newspapers, and
associations promoting Taiwanese culture, etc.). (12) The aim of its first
initiatives was to commemorate the victims and to gather accounts from
their descendants and other witnesses, tasks that were essential, since they
were the only ones who could counter the historical perspective put forward
by the regime. Hitherto, on the rare occasions when the Government
mentioned the events of February-March 1947, it justified the violence of
the time as a response to a Communist insurrection. 
Although in February 1987, the demonstrators, in particular in the towns
of Chiayi and Changhua, were in conflict with the police, the lifting of
Martial Law in July of that year contributed to the growing number of
participants from 1988 onwards. In 1989, the first public monument
honouring the victims was inaugurated in Chiayi. The following year,
President Lee Teng-hui asked the Executive Yuan to form an independent
commission tasked with shedding light on the 228 Incident. Led by
Professor Lai Tse-han, co-author of a landmark work on the events of
1947, (13) the Commission was made up of several historians who, to
compensate for the biases of the government archives (without,
nonetheless, neglecting them, since to this day they are the principal source
of available documentation), and in order to understand the reality of the
massacres, carried out oral history surveys over the whole island.
Although it was not the first study on the subject since 1987, the research
group’s report marked a change of paradigm, since after its authors
presented their conclusions to the government in 1992, the state agreed
to recognise the abject nature of the 1947 massacres. (14) In 1995, a national
monument was erected in Taipei in a park that was subsequently renamed
the Peace and 228 Memorial Park (Ererba heping jinian gongyuan) at a time
when most of the districts in Taiwan were erecting commemorative
monuments dedicated to the victims of the 1947 massacres, often adding
plaques in memory of local episodes. The park also houses a museum,
opened in 1997 by the Taipei town council, on the history of the massacres.
Also in 1995, Lee Teng-hui presented excuses in the name of the state for
the wrong done in 1947, shortly before the act governing the compensation
granted to the families of victims of the 228 Incident was passed. It was
also decided that 28 February should be a commemorative public holiday. 
Three draft acts were filed in 1992 regarding compensation for the victims
of 1947. Though they differed as to the amount of compensation to be
awarded and in the attitude to be adopted towards the authors of the
massacres, they were put forward by representatives of both the KMT and
the DPP, and no state institution displayed reservations as to the validity of
compensation. The legislative framework for the compensation of victims
of the 228 Incident (Ererba shijian chuli ji buchang tiaoli) was adopted on
7 April 1995. It determined the amount (granting a maximum of 6 million
New Taiwanese Dollars [NTD], that is to say, 163,712 Euros, to the family
of someone who lost their life in 1947) and the procedures for awarding
compensation, responsibility for which was given to a public body called
The 228 Memorial Foundation (Ererba shijian jinian jijinhui), also in charge
of official commemorations. 
Responsibility of the state or of the KMT? 
Despite the consensus that emerged in the 1990s on the necessity of
compensating the victims of the events of February-March 1947, there
remain even today points of discord resulting from differing interpretations
of the events, which reflect the positions on the Taiwanese political scene
of the players concerned. Although the estimate of the number of victims
has been the subject of much discussion, (15) the responsibility of the former
leaders in the 1947 massacres gave rise to a second deployment of
transitional justice measures in 2007, initiatives that on this occasion did
not meet with an inter-party consensus. The problem of the responsibility
of the former elites quickly crystallised around the person of Chiang Kai-
shek. On 28 February 1990, participants in the commemoration organised
by the local section of the DPP attached a white banner to a statue of the
former leader on which he presents his excuses to victims of the 228
Incident. (16) To this day, each 28 February, effigies of Chiang Kai-shek still
standing in public places have been daubed with graffiti or damaged,
indicating the responsibility of this strongly nationalist man in the 1947
massacres.
Using the then-available sources, the 1990 Commission established that
the Head of State bore a moderate degree of responsibility, and was above
all guilty of placing too much trust in the Governor of Taiwan, Chen I. It
concluded that Chen I and the officers on duty in Taiwan were the
Nationalist officials who had played the most important roles in the
massacres. (17) Since Chen I was executed in 1950 for having established
links with the Chinese Communist Party, few voices in the conservative
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that the historian Lee Hsiao-feng had, amongst other works, already published Ererba xiaoshi de
Taiwan jingying (The Taiwanese Elite Lost during Ererba), Taipei, Zili Baoxi, 1990; similarly Lee
Hsiao-feng, and Chang Yen-hsien (eds.), Ererba shijian huiyi yi (Compilation of Memoirs of the
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15. The estimate usually used is that taken from the 1992 Report giving the number of deaths as be-
tween 18,000 and 28,000. If we consider all existing publications, including the most partisan,
we arrive at a minimum of 800 deaths and a maximum of 100,000. Stefan Fleischauer, “Perspec-
tives on 228: The 28 February 1947 Uprising in Contemporary Taiwan,” in Gunter Schubert, Jens
Damm (eds), Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-first Century, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 39.
16. Wu Nai-teh, “Écrire sur une blessure ‘nationale.’ Mémoire des événements du 28 février
1947” (Writing on a “national” wound. Memory of the events of 28 February 1947), in Samia Fer-
hat, Sandrine Marchand (eds), Taiwan, île de mémoires (Taiwan, Island of Memories), Lyon, Tigre
de papier, 2011, p. 69. 
17. Lai Tze-han (Ed.), “Ererba shijian” yanjiu baogao (Report on the “228 Incident”), op. cit., pp. 410-412.
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camp were raised in his defence. However, he was never blamed in his
lifetime and the other officials implicated in the massacres were able to
pursue successful careers within the Nationalist system. Although from the
beginning of the rehabilitation movement, participants had requested
symbolic sanctions against the officers of the troops implicated in the
massacres such as the loss of any military honours they might have
received, the KMT did not bow to these requirements when the Act was
passed in 1995. 
Set aside during the implementation of the framework designed to obtain
justice for the victims of the events of February-March 1947, the question
of the role of the various players of the time came to the fore in the public
debate held at the end of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency. The day following
his victory in the presidential election of 2000, the DPP had set up a
Program for the exhaustive collection of the archives relating to the 228
Incident (Ererba dangan souji zhengli gongzuo jihua) that was to lead to
the creation of the documentation bank of the future National Archives
Office (guojia danganju) as provided for in the National Archives Act (guojia
dang an fa) of 1999. 
In 2003, the public foundation in charge of compensating the victims of
1947 formed a team to seek out the truth about the 228 Incident (Ererba
shijian zhenxiang yanjiu xiaozu). Its mission was to examine the entire
decision-making chain that led to the massacres with the help of
documents to which the first governmental commission in 1990 did not
have access. The commission reported its conclusions in a report published
in 2006, in which the third part of the third chapter was entitled “The
principal person responsible: The nationalist head of state Chiang Kai-shek”
(Zui da zerenzhe: guominzhengfu zhudu Jiang Jieshi). (18) The sources
examined by the Commission show, in fact, that the former head of state
was fully aware of the situation in Taiwan and that the decision to send in
the army seems not to have been a hasty one but rather the result of
mature consideration. 
The conclusions of the Report were taken up by Chen Shui-bian in a
speech made in February 2007 where he first emphasised that “historic
material and the government archives attest that Chiang Kai-shek was the
principal guilty party in the 228 Incident” (shiliao ji zhengfu dangan queren
Jiang Jieshi shi Ererba shijian de yuanxiong) before calling for Taiwan to be
made into a “normal country” (zhengchang de guojia) by expunging the last
vestiges of the glorification of the authoritarian regime. (19) Though fairly
short, the speech included no fewer than five direct references to the events
of February-March 1947, which were sufficient to symbolise nationalist
repression as a whole. The most spectacular decision following this speech
was the attempt to change the name of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial in
Taipei to the Taiwan Democracy Memorial (Taiwan minzhu jinianguan),
which met with opposition from the KMT. (20) However, the Nationalist Party
had the last word thanks to its victory in the 2008 presidential election.
Despite the widespread media coverage it had benefitted from – the island’s
four main daily newspapers devoted 694 articles to it between January
2007 and the end of September 2009 – the low level of debate between
the players discussing the justification for renaming the Memorial was such
that it was more readily associated with a partisan scuffle between the KMT
and the DPP than with reflection on the subject of the authoritarian past. (21)
Though it went virtually unnoticed compared to this affair, the change
made to the title of the act compensating the families of the victims of
1947 was nonetheless significant. In March 2007, the term peichang
(reparation) replaced that of buchang (compensation). From a judicial point
of view, peichang supposes compensation following an illegal action
resulting from the deliberate desire to do harm on the part of the instigator,
which raises the question of the responsibility of a third party in the
wrongdoing committed, a problem that is avoided when one uses the term
buchang. The name of the compensation act, now Ererba shijian chuliji
peichang tiaoli, therefore signifies that the massacres did not result from
an unfortunate series of events that were not initiated by central
government, but that the latter was fully aware of the consequences of
sending troops to Taiwan. 
Despite this concession and the presentation of excuses each 28 February
by Ma Ying-jeou when he was in power (2008-2016), commemorations of
the 228 Incident reveal the differences in memories of the events of 1947
as well as the political weight they carry, rather than a possible calming of
high-running passions. Take for example the commemorations organised in
Taipei during the Ma presidency. Every year, the 228 Memorial Foundation
organises a ceremony in the 228 Peace Park based on forgiveness,
reconciliation, and remembrance that mainly focuses on the recognition of
the victims’ suffering. The same day, different civic groups close to the pro-
independence movement and the National Chapter of the Taiwanese
Association for Support of Victims of the 228 Incident (Taiwan 228 guanhuai
xiehui), an organisation for the families of victims, organises a
demonstration beginning at 2:28 p.m. in the place where the first riot took
place on the evening of 27 February 1947. Held annually, this finishes in
the 228 Peace Park. Leading figures in the DPP and members of other pro-
independence associations take part, with the Party even organising its own
demonstration some years. 
The commemoration of the 228 Incident therefore brings together all the
Taiwanese nationalists, from radicals advocating the independence of
Taiwan in the medium or short-term to the cadres of the DPP, all united in
their opposition to the Chinese nationalism defended by the KMT and CCP.
The park itself is occupied by pro-independence activists, some of whom
carry the banners of the groups they belong to, and others placards
denouncing Chiang Kai-shek as the main guilty party in the 1947 massacres.
The demonstrators occupy a different space from that of the official
commemoration, although there is no tension between participants in the
two ceremonies and anyone can move from one to the other without
encountering any problems.
Finally, since 2013, for the whole day, various associations close to the
pro-independence movement, working on societal issues other than the
island’s political status, have stands at the entrance of the Chiang Kai-shek
Memorial, not far from the 228 Park. Concerts are held there that attract
audiences of all ages whilst activists from the pro-independence groups
tend to be elderly. Speeches by those participating in the non-official
commemorations accuse the KMT of not being sincere in its repentance.
As Chen I-shen, a researcher at the Modern History Institute of the
Academia Sinica, pointed out in a speech made during the 2013
30 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 7 / 2
18. Li Wang-tai, Yang Chen-long, and Chang Yen-hsien (eds), Ererba shijian zeren guishu yanjiu baogao
shu (Report on Studies on Responsibilities in the 228 Incident), Taipei, Caituan faren Ererba shijian
jinian jijinhui, 2006, pp. 145-169.
19. Jiang Jieshi xiang zhi 228 tusha shijian (Chiang Kai-shek and the 228 Incident), Ziyou shibao (Lib-
erty Times), 26 February 2006, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/117507 (accessed on
29 April 2016).
20. For further details on this matter see Wu Nai-teh, “Écrire sur une blessure ‘nationale.’ Mémoire
des événements du 28 février 1947,” op. cit., pp. 69-71.
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demonstration, although Ma Ying-jeou as Secretary-General of the KMT has
apologised several times, he also continues to visit the Chiang Kai-shek
mausoleum to pay homage to Chiang on the anniversary of his death. If his
apologies made in the name of the KMT are to ring true, the party must, in
his opinion, mark a clear break with the former party-state. Ma’s successors
at the head of the KMT have, moreover, adopted the same attitude,
attesting to the fact that the leaders of the Nationalist Party are incapable
of cutting their links with their former leader. Even today, Chiang Kai-shek
remains the “eternal leader” (yonjiu zongcai) of the KMT, a title conferred
upon him after his death. He embodies the historical memory of the Party,
which has long been the source of its legitimacy, and it is this that its leaders
do not wish to tamper with. The inability of the Nationalist camp to reform
itself can be seen in the manner in which the state has recognised the
victims of the White Terror. 
An unfinished task: Recognition of the
victims of the White Terror
During a stay in Taiwan for the purposes of this survey, I was told by a former
editor of Ziyou shidai that the magazine had tried, before 1987, to interview
the families of the victims of the 228 Incident but that the great majority of
them refused to speak. (22) It was only after the rehabilitation movement began
that they broke their silence. The first associations of victims were created
around 1992, and the national association around 1995. The victims of the
White Terror, on the other hand, began to form groups before 1987. Between
1983 and 1987, family celebrations and the founding of the DPP served as
the pretext for three meetings of former prisoners from all over the Island. (23)
The possibility of creating associations was brought up. 
As soon as martial law was lifted, the victims of the White Terror founded
two groups. Members of the bigger of the two, the Association of Mutual
Aid for Political Prisoners in Taiwan (Taiwan diqu zhengzhi shounanren
huzhui or Mutual Aid Association), were Communists who wished for
unification with China, whilst the Fraternal Association of Taiwanese Political
Prisoners (Taiwan zhengzhi shounanzhe lianyi zonghui) promoted
independence. After including the fight for independence in its charter, the
latter association was immediately banned and certain of its cadres were
sent to prison. It nonetheless continued to exist informally before being re-
established in 2000.
An ambiguous compensation law
The vote in 1995 in favour of compensatory measures relating to the 228
Incident appears to have been an indispensable precedent in that it gave
birth to public action norms that were then used in the rehabilitation of
victims of the White Terror. In 1997, Hsieh Tsung-min, Member of Parliament
and former political prisoner, submitted a draft Act that received the support
of DPP members of parliament as well as a few elected members from the
conservative camp. The prologue to this text ended with an appeal enjoining
members of parliament to act “in accordance with the spirit of the measures
structuring compensation for the 228 Incident” (yi Ererba shijian chuli ji
buchang tiaoli zhi jingshen) by compensating the victims of the White
Terror. This appeal was only partly respected, since there are notable
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Photo 1 – Participants in the demonstration co-organised by the Taiwanese 228 Solidarity Association.
In 2014, pro-independence demonstrators occupied the space around the monument dedicated to the victims whilst the official
commemoration took place near the museum. The demonstrator in the foreground is holding a banner on which is written “228
Massacre Garden.” © Vladimir Stolojan.
differences in the tone of the 1997 debates and those preceding the passing
of the 1995 Act. 
Although since 1992 there had been a broad consensus as to the need to
compensate the families of the 1947 victims, in 1997, the representative
of the Ministry of Defence opposed the rehabilitation of all the victims of
the White Terror. Although acknowledging that there may have been many
who were convicted though innocent, and the severity of military justice,
he asserted that martial law “had undeniable merits for the maintenance
of national security in the face of pressure from Communist China” (dan
duiyu Zhonggong de yali, ji guojia anquan de weihu, qi gonglao bu ke
fouren). He also emphasised that “there can be no doubt as to the fair
nature of the legal system [and therefore of military justice during the
authoritarian era]” (shenpan zhidu de gongzhengxing ying bu rongyizhi), a
system whose legitimacy he defended on several occasions. (24)
The Ministry of Defence delegate was opposed to the draft under
discussion for two reasons. His first objection was that the military tribunals
were empowered to judge civilians on the basis of laws other than martial
law and the various other measures relating to police repression during the
authoritarian era, giving as an example those judged in the case of armed
robbery, a crime covered by the military penal code during the period of
imposition of martial law, or people prosecuted under the Measures relating
to military secrecy (Fanghai junji zhizui tiaoli). Turning the request for justice
against the defenders of the rights of the victims of the White Terror, he
argued that only compensating the victims of laws that had allowed the
detention of political prisoners would be unfair to other civilians who had
passed before the military tribunals and would be a cause of disorder. (25)
The second objection was formulated through a rhetorical question that
saw the Ministry of Defence delegate return to the present. 
Today, Communist China has not abandoned the use of weapons to
threaten Taiwan, […] the Mainland party wants to collect our military
secrets using, for most of the time, civilians coming and going from
one side of the Straight to the other, in these circumstances, should
these people be convicted? And after they have been convicted,
should they be given compensation? (26)
He was targeting, without naming them, civilians convicted before 1991
for their participation in pro-Communist groups. (27) Their rehabilitation is
impossible because it would open the door to compensating those who in
1997 were spying on Taiwan on orders from Beijing. He makes no mention
of the fact that, although the Chinese threat was active both before and
after the authoritarian era, Taiwan’s political context is totally different. 
In addition to these differences of opinion with the Ministry of Defence,
the members of parliament behind the draft law disagreed with the
representative of another ministry to which the former police system was
responsible, the Ministry of Justice. This time, the debate concerned the
revision of Article 9 of the National Security Law (guojia anquan fa), which
stipulates that civilians judged under military law during the period of
Martial Law cannot appeal against their conviction once martial law has
been lifted. Despite the fact that this provision contradicts the text of
martial law itself that grants civilians the right to appeal, since its adoption
in 1987 it has prevented the review of any trial conducted by a military
court between 1949 and 1987. 
Hsieh Tsung-min had already attempted to abolish Article 9 of the
National Security Act prior to 1997, without much success. It had been put
to him that since 90,000 people were thought to have passed before a
military court during the period of martial law, the revision of such a large
number of trials would clog up the courts and paralyse the entire legal
system. (28) In the Legislative Yuan during the debates in 1997, the
representative of the Ministry of Justice reaffirmed the constitutional nature
of the National Security Act and refused its revision. Whilst recognising that
it is impossible to have an idea of the number of people judged by the
military courts, it continued to affirm that giving those formerly convicted
the chance to appeal against former sentences would impede the smooth
running of the legal system. 
Promulgated in June 1998, the Measures for the compensation of false
accusations of espionage and sedition during the period of martial law
(jieyan shiqi budang panluan ji feidie shenpan anjian buchang tiaoli) include,
to a certain degree, the reservations of the representatives of the two
ministries. On the one hand, Article 9 of the National Security Act had not
been amended, which meant that payment of compensation did not mean
that the verdict formerly delivered by the military court was invalidated. In
other words, the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime was not called into
question. On the other hand, Article 8 of the Compensation Act excluded
people “for whom the accusation of sedition or of preparing a foreign
aggression remained valid under the terms of today’s laws or after
examination of legal proof” (yi xianxing falu huo zhengju faze shencha, jing
rending jiefan neiluanzui, waihuan zui que you shijuzhe). 
In theory, anyone belonging to a group affiliated with the CCP could not
demand compensation. (29) With the exception of these two points, the 1998
Act reprises the measures decided upon during the formulation of the 1995
Law intended to obtain justice for the victims of the 228 Incident. The
maximum amount of compensation is 6 million NTD, (30) the same as what
was fixed for the victims of 1947. This evaluation does not take into account
the fact that Article 8 of the Act for the suppression of the rebellion allowed
the nationalisation of the possessions of people convicted of sedition. So
the descendants of someone condemned to death who had already received
the maximum compensation could not demand anything in respect of
possessions previously seized. Lastly, as in 1995, the management of
financial reparation was entrusted to a public foundation. 
Placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, the Foundation’s
mandate began at the end of 1998 and was renewed three times. It was
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wound up in 2014. The deadline for filing a compensation claim was fixed,
after several extensions, at December 2010. (31) In all, the foundation
received 10,065 files. 1,940 were rejected for not relating to victims of the
White Terror, as were 96 others under Article 8 of the 1998 Act, whilst 7,965
applications were accepted, and 20,340 people were compensated. (32)
Article 8, which excludes certain victims from the compensatory measures,
was admittedly applied but interpreted in a loosely way, since 95% of those
convicted who were not compensated had been involved in incidents linked
to the use or possession of firearms. (33) In most cases, a sum was deducted
from the total awarded to a former prisoner to whom Article 8 might have
applied if it had been strictly interpreted. Moreover, 1,500 other people
eligible for compensation were identified but their cases were not dealt
with, since their families had not filed an application. (34) Consequently, the
reform of the National Security Law would not have resulted in the paralysis
of the legal system, contrary to what had been suggested in 1997. 
So that the compensation process was not limited to material compensation,
a procedure was set up to provide those compensated, if they so wished, with
a Certificate of Rehabilitation of Reputation (huifu mingyu zhengshu). Intended
to provide psychological support and individualise the state’s apology to each
of the victims, the certificates were first issued for the victims of the 228
Incident before being granted to those of the White Terror. Though they
attested to the innocence of the recipient, these certificates nevertheless did
not invalidate the verdicts pronounced during the period of martial law, since
the National Security Law guaranteed the legitimacy of the former military
courts. Intended to occupy a central role in the rehabilitation of former
prisoners, the certificates received a mixed welcome from victims of the White
Terror, since only 4,055 of them were distributed between 2004 and 2014. (35)
In addition to the annual commemorations, conferences, and several study
projects, the Foundation also supervised the construction of a national
monument, inaugurated in 2008 and dedicated to the victims of the White
Terror. Since 2007, this has been the place where every year on 15 July, the
date on which martial law was lifted, government ceremonies in memory of
the persecutions of the authoritarian era have been held. The monument was
erected a stone’s throw from the presidential palace on Boulevard Ketagalan,
in a corner of a park known as Jieshou gongyuan or “Chiang Kai-shek Long Life
Park.” It is therefore, rather paradoxically, a celebration both of Chiang Kai-shek
and a homage to the victims of his regime.
The emergence of White Terror memoirs
The first biographies by victims (36) were published in Taiwan towards the
end of the 1980s at the same time as the first initiatives organised either
by former Communist prisoners or by those advocating independence. The
rehabilitation of the victims of the 228 Incident was largely supported by
former pro-independence prisoners from the other side, who whilst wanting
justice for the victims of 1947 did not link themselves to the other players
in the movement, since they did not share their ideology. Nonetheless,
although their members were very active (those from the Mutual Aid
Association founded the Workers’ Party Laodong dang and cultural
associations advocating socialism, whilst the former pro-independence
prisoners worked for the establishment of independence after 1987), the
demonstrations by prisoners’ associations did not have at all the same
impact as those organised in memory of the 228 Incident. 
Although the 1947 massacres had found in the overseas pro-
independence movement a vehicle enabling both the transmission of
memory and a way of adding meaning to the events of 1947, there was no
social milieu that could help rapidly affirm a homogeneous memoir of the
White Terror. In this respect, 1993 marked a beginning, since the discovery
in May by a member of the Mutual Aid Association of the bodies of 265
political prisoners executed during the White Terror (most of them between
1950 and 1953 at a time when the regime was disbanding the Working
Committee for Taiwan Province founded under the instructions of Beijing)
led the Association to start a dialogue with the Mayor of Taipei, under the
control of the DPP between 1994 and 1998, for the institutional recognition
of the site. 
Moreover, at the same time, the Association began to organise annual
commemorations in the Youth Park (Qingnian gongyuan) formerly known
as Machang ding, a place of execution in the 1950s. These two places were
recognised by the town council in the months following the passing of the
1998 compensation Law, and the name of Machang ding was given back
to the part of the Youth Park where the executions took place whilst a White
Terror Memorial Park (baise kongbu jinian gongyuan) was created in Liu
Zhang-li. Although linked more specifically to the persecutions of the 1950s,
when the great majority of the victims were Communists, these two sites
were the first to create a physical anchor-point for the memory of the White
Terror as a whole. Nonetheless, over the same period, the Mutual Aid
Association maintained an attitude of deep-seated defiance towards the
DPP on account of their differing points of view on the island’s status.
Therefore, when the DPP town council of Taipei tried to mount an oral
history project, the leaders of the Association prevaricated and refused to
work with the Taipei town council, to the displeasure of certain of its
members, and ultimately moved closer to the government of the province
of Taiwan, headed by a member of the conservative wing of the KMT, Soong
Chu-yu (James Soong).
In the end, two projects were mounted, one by the Taiwan Provincial
Historical Research Committee (Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuan hui) and
the other by the Taipei City Historical Research Committee (Taipei shi
wenxian weiyuan hui), with the Mutual Aid Association favouring the
former. It nonetheless asked its members, when they were interviewed, not
to mention other prisoners or talk about relations between the former
Communist cells, and even not to talk about their own case. (37) The defiance
of the cadres of the Mutual Aid Association and disagreements over the
over-politicisation of the group led to the creation in 1997 of a third
association, the Association for the Rehabilitation of the Trials of the White
Terror of the 1950s (Wu shi niandai baise kongbu anjian pingfan cujinhui).
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This brought together members of the Mutual Aid Association for whom
the rehabilitation of former prisoners was more important than the
preservation of Communist purity, which would have gone against the idea
of compensation. Moreover, after 1998, the existence of a motion excluding
certain prisoners also contributed to a great deal of dissimulation on the
part of former Communist prisoners. 
Having begun his surveys in 2007, Lin Chuan-kai observed considerable
differences between those accounts gathered in the 1990s and the accounts
he was able to gather, since out of 231 interviewees imprisoned for taking
part in the Working Committee for Taiwan Province, only one continued to
assert that he had been wrongly convicted, whilst the others admitted
having, in one way or another, belonged to this CCP-affiliated group, and in
later documents all the interviewees denied having had links with the
Committee. (38)
Over and above these questions that relate more to Communist memory
of the White Terror, (39) the 1990s saw the persistence of a stigma linked to
the identity of the victim. This had its origins just as much in the language
of the authoritarian era that presented political prisoners as “spies” (feidie)
in the pay of foreign powers as in the surveillance they were subjected to
after they were released from prison: visits from the police to the home of
former prisoners and other humiliations suffered in their professional life or
by their children at school. The type of thinking created by the former
official ideology did not immediately vanish after the lifting of martial law
but continued to influence the perceptions of a section of the island’s
population over the next decade. By way of example, when I asked the
daughter of a prisoner if she had spoken to her friends about her father’s
experiences, she replied that when she was in secondary school at the end
of the 1990s: 
I once casually mentioned it to my best friend at the time, and she
said “So you are a Communist spy?” And that left a mark on me,
because you don’t know what to say. And…no, it wasn’t something
I talked about. (40)
The former prisoners also retained the habit of self-censorship. Wrongly
convicted and with no particular political affiliations, Chen Hsin-ji managed
to hide his past as a prisoner from his wife and children by coming to an
agreement with the police that he would go to the police station himself
in order to avoid visits to their home, only beginning to share his experiences
with those close to him following a change of government in 2000. (41)
Although there have been examples of prisoners fully assuming their past
in public, illustrating once again the diversity of the victims’ experiences,
they remain in the minority. The 1998 Compensation Law led to the
emergence of freer speech, a tendency that grew with the change of
government in 2000 and which was synonymous with the consolidation of
the democratic process. 
Moreover, although originally linked to the 228 Incident, the constitution
of the Archives Office has greatly assisted research into the White Terror.
Historians in charge of the collection have easily been able to convince
Chen Shui-bian to include documents linked to the White Terror found in
the various departments of the Ministry of Defence. They were also able to
collect a certain number of letters and other private texts that had not been
given back to the victims. The opening of its archives and the gradual
restitution of these documents has led to many more discussions between
former prisoners and victims’ families from all sides of civil society, often in
conjunction with Taiwanese academics working on questions of collective
memory. It was an initiative that led to a second wave of freer speech,
mainly in the second half of the 2000s. I am thinking in particular of the
interviews conducted by the Taiwanese Foundation for Truth and
Reconciliation (Taiwan minjian zhenxiang yu hejie cujin hui). Between 2008
and 2013, its volunteers transcribed the words of almost 240 victims and
descendants who had never before expressed themselves publicly. Still with
the idea of transmitting memories, since 2008, the Chen Wen-cheng
Foundation has organised a summer workshop called The Human Rights
Path (renquan zhilu) at Green Island Prison, the main detention site for
political prisoners. For three days, former victims of different political
persuasions come to the detention centre to share their experiences with
an audience of students. Seminars are also organised there to give the young
participants extra information. 
Interaction between members of civil society, prisoners’ associations, and
victims who do not identify with the political polarisation of the former
prisoners’ groups has facilitated the gradual emergence of an environment
able to foster the construction and dissemination of a homogeneous
memorial account of the White Terror. The work is nonetheless far from
complete. Even though it quickly financed oral history work, for a long time
the state seemed to be on the side-lines of the memorial recognition
dynamic. Over and above the initiatives of the Foundation in charge of
compensating the victims of the White Terror, from 1999 onwards, the state
has been involved in the preservation of the prison on Green Island, which
opened its doors to the public in 2002, and then of Jingmei Prison, another
site where political prisoners were held. The two sites were placed together
in 2011 in the National Museum of Human Rights (guojia renquan
bowuguan). Although the setting up of the site reveals a lack of overall
vision and ad-hoc management, (42) and major differences still exist between
the museum’s version of the account and the demands of the victims’
groups, (43) the museum is now actively engaged in the publication of
biographies of former prisoners and oral history surveys. It is nonetheless
regrettable that this has come at a time when the generation of witnesses
and victims is disappearing.
Conclusion
The 228 Incident and the White Terror, Taiwan’s two most traumatic post-
war experiences, have not solicited the same degree of memorial
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engagement. Although the 1947 massacres now occupy an iconic place in
pro-independence thinking, the White Terror, a historic episode that covered
a more varied range of experiences, does not have the same symbolic reach.
It therefore seems difficult to attach the idea of collective memory to the
accounts given by victims of the White Terror, since despite the existence of
common suffering and the stigma endured by the families of victims from
all sides, the work of homogenising memories into a collective memory is
incomplete. It is nonetheless possible, even probable, that the passage of
time will erase the differences that exist between the various accounts, which
may lead to the emergence of a genuine collective memory. 
Over and above these fundamental differences, the rehabilitation of the
victims of 1947 and of the White Terror has met with resistance from the
Nationalist camp, which cannot bring itself to completely disavow the
former party-state. Although the sufferings of the victims have been
recognised and form the main thrust of institutional accounts, political
struggles during the White Terror, the experiences of the victims’ families,
and the point of view of the former torturers have tended to be somewhat
eclipsed. Since memory is dynamic in character, it is possible that these
accounts will change in the future even if it seems unlikely that the former
officials of military justice will publicly repent, as has been seen in the truth
and reconciliation commissions. 
Another problem lies in the full recognition of the responsibility of the
authoritarian state, and similarly the problem of being able, or not, to
dissociate the KMT from the former party-state. To date, the Nationalist
camp has opposed the full condemnation of the authoritarian regime, which
would involve not necessarily declaring it illegal but at least understanding
the period of martial law as an abnormal political framework and not a
simple pis-aller, necessary during the Cold War. It would also involve revising
judgments handed down by the former military courts and the withdrawal
of Article 8 of the 1998 Law that excluded certain victims from
compensatory measures. Similarly, if we consider the KMT and the former
party-state to be the same entity, it would be logical for the party to
contribute to the payment of compensation, since it was solely responsible
to the democratic state and therefore, ultimately, to Taiwanese tax-payers. 
It should also be emphasised once again that the spoliation of the
property of victims given heavy sentences was not included in the 1998
Law and was the subject of little debate in the decade that followed. In fact,
it raised very awkward problems (how to calculate potential compensation,
on what document should the value of the goods seized be estimated, who
should pay for the restitution of the goods, etc.), which in the present state
of knowledge make passage of a law governing the question very difficult.
The draft Act filed in March does not tackle this problem. It is, however, very
ambitious, since it targets four objectives: the opening of the archives, the
restitution of goods wrongly acquired by the KMT (which is different from
spoliation), the withdrawal of still visible symbols of the authoritarian
regime, and the righting of injustices linked to the period of martial law, in
an effort to progress towards justice and reconciliation. Although they raise
different problems, the resolution of these questions should by and large
put an end to the heritage of the authoritarian era. It only remains to bring
the work of constituting a collective memory, which to date is far from
complete, to a satisfactory conclusion.
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Photo 2 – Several generations pay homage to those who died in Green Island prison.
During its workshop, the Foundation tries to favour intergenerational dialogue by providing many opportunities for discussion. 
Here in 2014, former prisoners and young participants gather to reflect together at the tombs of guards and prisoners. © Vladimir Stolojan.
